After nearly two years of "two weeks to flatten the curve", the alleged emergence and "emergency" of a novel coronavirus pandemic just so happened to serve longstanding agendas to radically transform society by way of ID2020, The Great Reset & Agenda 2030.
Mainstream talking heads frequently compare covid to the so-called Spanish Flu of 1918 - said to have claimed up to 100 million lives at a time when the world population was estimated to be 1.8 billion. In reality, covid compares more closely with the pandemics of the 50s and 60s.
1957-1958: Asian Flu Pandemic
Back in 1957, when the world population was only 2.8 billion, there was a global pandemic that is said to have claimed up to 4 million lives, commonly referred to as the "Asian Flu". There was no global hysteria, no "lockdowns", no mandates and no radical reordering of society in the name of safety.
1968-1969: Hong Kong Flu
In 1968, when the world population was only 3.5 billion, there was another global pandemic, also said to have claimed up to 4 million lives, commonly referred to as the "Hong Kong Flu". This barely registered as a historical footnote - the famous music festival Woodstock went on at the time. There was again no hysteria, no lockdowns, no mandates and no radical reordering of society.
1976: Swine Flu
During the Swine Flu epidemic of 1976, mainstream media fearmongered about the return of a 1918-like event. There was much fear induced on the count of it being "novel". Out came a rushed plan to vaccinate everybody. While most articles have since been scrubbed, you can still watch the 60 Minutes documentary describing the devastating effects on the uncensorable video archive.
2009: Swine Flu
2009 saw the resurgence of "swine flu" hysteria, again playing the novelty card and the parallels to 1918 as billions of dollars in vaccines were sold. Much was written on how and why the world overreacted, even a Forbes article - "Why the WHO Faked a Pandemic". Documentaries were produced covering the fraud and conflicts of interest. People from all walks of life spoke out. Much of which has since been censored, so the world forgot all about it. Some papers were written about the adverse effects of the rushed vaccines.
2010: Lock Step
In 2010, the Global Business Network & Rockefeller Foundation published within "Scenarios For The Future Of Technology And International Development" what has come to be known as the Lock Step document, where they wrote of a "ficticious future 2012 pandemic scenario" that describes precisely the same narrative we are now seeing propagandized the world over. In case the link becomes inaccessible, here is a complete transcription (emphasis ours):
A world of tighter top-down government control and more authoritarian leadership, with limited innovation and growing citizen pushback
In 2012, the pandemic that the world had been anticipating for years finally hit. Unlike 2009's H1N1, this new influenza strain - originating from wild geese - was extremely virulent and deadly. Even the most pandemic-prepared nations were quickly overwhelmed when the virus streaked around the world, infecting nearly 20 percent of the global population and killing 8 million in just seven months, the majority of them healthy young adults. The pandemic also had a deadly effect on economies: international mobility of both people and goods screeched to a halt, debilitating industries like tourism and breaking global supply chains. Even locally, normally bustling shops and office buildings sat empty for months, devoid of both employees and customers.
The pandemic blanketed the planet - though disproportionate numbers died in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America, where the virus spread like wildfire in the absence of official containment protocols. But even in developed countries, containment was a challenge. The United States's initial policy "strongly discouraging" citizens from flying proved deadly in its leniency, accelerating the spread of the virus not just within the U.S. but across borders. However, a few countries did fare better - China in particular. The Chinese government's quick imposition and enforcement of mandatory quarantine for all citizens, as well as its instant and near-hermetic sealing off of all borders, saved millions of lives, stopping the spread of the virus far earlier than in other countries and enabling a swifter post-pandemic recovery.
China's government was not the only one that took extreme measures to protect its citizens from risk and exposure. During the pandemic, national leaders around the world flexed their authority and imposed airtight rules and restrictions, from the mandatory wearing of face masks to body-temperature checks at the entries to communal spaces like train stations and supermarkets. Even after the pandemic faded, this more authoritarian control and oversight of citizens and their activities stuck and even intensified. In order to protect themselves from the spread of increasingly global problems - from pandemics and transnational terrorism to environmental crises and rising poverty - leaders around the world took a firmer grip on power.
At first, the notion of a more controlled world gained wide acceptance and approval. Citizens willingly gave up some of their sovereignty - and their privacy - to more paternalistic states in exchange for greater safety and stability. Citizens were more tolerant, and even eager, for top-down direction and oversight, and national leaders had more latitude to impose order in the ways they saw fit. In developed countries, this heightened oversight took many forms: biometric IDs for all citizens, for example, and tighter regulation of key industries whose stability was deemed vital to national interests. In many developed countries, enforced cooperation with a suite of new regulations and agreements slowly but steadily restored both order and, importantly, economic growth.
Across the developing world, however, the story was different - and much more variable. Top-down authority took different forms in different countries, hinging largely on the capacity, caliber, and intentions of their leaders. In countries with strong and thoughtful leaders, citizens' overall economic status and quality of life increased. In India, for example, air quality drastically improved after 2016, when the government outlawed high-emitting vehicles. In Ghana, the introduction of ambitious government programs to improve basic infrastructure and ensure the availability of clean water for all her people led to a sharp decline in water-borne diseases. But more authoritarian leadership worked less well - and in some cases tragically - in countries run by irresponsible elites who used their increased power to pursue their own interests at the expense of their citizens.
There were other downsides, as the rise of virulent nationalism created new hazards: spectators at the 2018 World Cup, for example, wore bulletproof vests that sported a patch of their national flag. Strong technology regulations stifled innovation, kept costs high, and curbed adoption. In the developing world, access to "approved" technologies increased but beyond that remained limited: the locus of technology innovation was largely in the developed world, leaving many developing countries on the receiving end of technologies that others consider "best" for them. Some governments found this patronizing and refused to distribute computers and other technologies that they scoffed at as "second hand." Meanwhile, developing countries with more resources and better capacity began to innovate internally to fill these gaps on their own.
Meanwhile, in the developed world, the presence of so many top-down rules and norms greatly inhibited entrepreneurial activity. Scientists and innovators were often told by governments what research lines to pursue and were guided mostly toward projects that would make money (e.g., market-driven product development) or were "sure bets" (e.g., fundamental research), leaving more risky or innovative research areas largely untapped. Well-off countries and monopolistic companies with big research and development budgets still made significant advances, but the IP behind their breakthroughs remained locked behind strict national or corporate protection. Russia and India imposed stringent domestic standards for supervising and certifying encryption-related products and their suppliers - a category that in reality meant all IT innovations. The U.S. and EU struck back with retaliatory national standards, throwing a wrench in the development and diffusion of technology globally.
Especially in the developing world, acting in one's national self-interest often meant seeking practical alliances that fit with those interests - whether it was gaining access to needed resources or banding together in order to achieve economic growth. In South America and Africa, regional and sub-regional alliances became more structured. Kenya doubled its trade with southern and eastern Africa, as new partnerships grew within the continent. China's investment in Africa expanded as the bargain of new jobs and infrastructure in exchange for access to key minerals or food exports proved agreeable to many governments. Cross-border ties proliferated in the form of official security aid. While the deployment of foreign security teams was welcomed in some of the most dire failed states, one-size-fits-all solutions yielded few positive results.
By 2025, people seemed to be growing weary of so much top-down control and letting leaders and authorities make choices for them.
Wherever national interests clashed with individual interests, there was conflict. Sporadic pushback became increasingly organized and coordinated, as disaffected youth and people who had seen their status and opportunities slip away - largely in developing countries - incited civil unrest. In 2026, protesters in Nigeria brought down the government, fed up with the entrenched cronyism and corruption. Even those who liked the greater stability and predictability of this world began to grow uncomfortable and constrained by so many tight rules and by the strictness of national boundaries. The feeling lingered that sooner or later, something would inevitably upset the neat order that the world's governments had worked so hard to establish.
2011: Health is more than influenza
The WHO published (and has since recently removed) an interesting article about how there is more to health than influenza. This has many parallels to what is now happening:
The repeated pandemic health scares caused by an avian H5N1 and a new A(H1N1) human influenza virus are part of the culture of fear.1–3 Worst-case thinking replaced balanced risk assessment. Worst-case thinking is motivated by the belief that the danger we face is so overwhelmingly catastrophic that we must act immediately. Rather than wait for information, we need a pre-emptive strike. But if resources buy lives, wasting resources wastes lives. The precautionary stocking of largely useless antivirals and the irrational vaccination policies against an unusually benign H1N1 virus wasted many billions of euros and eroded the trust of the public in health officials.4–6 The pandemic policy was never informed by evidence, but by fear of worst-case scenarios.
In both pandemics of fear, the exaggerated claims of a severe public health threat stemmed primarily from disease advocacy by influenza experts. In the highly competitive market of health governance, the struggle for attention, budgets and grants is fierce. The pharmaceutical industry and the media only reacted to this welcome boon. We therefore need fewer, not more “pandemic preparedness” plans or definitions. Vertical influenza planning in the face of speculative catastrophes is a recipe for repeated waste of resources and health scares, induced by influenza experts with vested interests in exaggeration. There is no reason for expecting any upcoming pandemic to be worse than the mild ones of 1957 or 1968,7 no reason for striking pre-emptively, no reason for believing that a proportional and balanced response would risk lives.
The opposite of pre-emptive strikes against worst-case scenarios are adaptive strategies that respond to emerging diseases of any nature based on the evidence of observed virulence and the effectiveness of control measures. This requires more generic capacity for disease surveillance, problem identification, risk assessment, risk communication and health-care response.1 Such strengthened general capacity can respond to all health emergencies, not just influenza. Resources are scarce and need to be allocated to many competing priorities. Scientific advice on resource allocation is best handled by generalists with a comprehensive view on health. Disease experts wish to capture public attention and sway resource allocation decisions in favour of the disease of their interest. We referred previously to the principles of guidance on health by the British National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE),2 cited as “We make independent decisions in an open, transparent way, based on the best available evidence and including input from experts and interested parties.”8 Support from disease experts is crucial in delivering opinion, scholarly advice and evidence to a team of independent general scientists. But this team should independently propose decisions to policy-makers and be held accountable for them.
The key to responsible policy-making is not bureaucracy but accountability and independence from interest groups. Decisions must be based on adaptive responses to emerging problems, not on definitions. WHO should learn to be NICE: accountable for reasonableness in a process of openness, transparency and dialogue with all the stakeholders, and particularly the public.9
2015: UN Agenda 2030
In September 2015, Canada and 192 other countries signed onto UN Agenda 2030, a totalitarian wolf in social justice sheep's clothing. A central part of UN's Agenda 2030 is "health", including vaccinating everybody. Bill Gates, one of the most prominent proponents of Agenda 2030 and among the largest funders of the WHO, has become one of the most influential figures in public health, to the extent of being treated as a head of state. Here he is saying every human being on the planet will need to be vaccinated.
2016: Implants within 10 years
While the idea of "microchipping people" has long been ridiculed as "just a conspiracy theory", Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum, openly talks about implanting human beings.
2019: UN & WEF partnership
In June 2019, the World Economic Forum partners with the UN to accelerate Agenda 2030.
2019: Event 201
While the likes of Johns Hopkins, the World Economic Forum, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation unsurprisingly insist it's all just a coincidence, Event 201 is another incredibly prescient event, a "pandemic exercise" taking place hardly a month before the first official claim of SARS-CoV-2 infection in Wuhan, China in late December 2019. Watch Event 201 here and here.
2019: Military Games in Wuhan
The 2019 Military Games just so happened to be taking place in Wuhan at the very same time as the pandemic exercises of Event 201.
2020: The Great Reset
As the hysteria of 2020 unfolded, Klaus Schwab wrote the book on leveraging said hysteria as an opportunity to radically reshape the world, COVID-19: The Great Reset. He then sent politicians around the world a free copy, and made a number of media appearances where he spoke of merging man with technology, a core concept of his Fourth Industrial Revolution.